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Abstract 
We respond to Lee’s (2020) commentary on our article “Demystifying the Influential IS Legends of 
Positivism” (Siponen & Tsohou [S&T], 2018). Lee offers four arguments against our analyses and 
conclusions in S&T (2018). First, because logical positivism has been discredited, he contends it 
cannot be used as a normative standard in IS. We clarify that our conclusions in S&T (2018) point 
to (1) the lack of justification for certain IS beliefs, and (2) a misunderstanding rather than the 
legitimacy of LP as a philosophy of science. Second, Lee argues that IS researchers characterizing 
positivism never said they were following the tenets of logical positivism. We provide evidence to 
show that some influential papers on positivism in IS research indicated they were indeed following 
logical positivism. Third, Lee offers an alternative explanation for the emergence and nature of IS 
positivism. His explanation has merit, and it can be accommodated in S&T’s (2018) account of 
positivism in IS. Unfortunately, his explanation does not account for certain problems in the IS 
discipline’s use of positivism. In S&T (2018), we provide a plausible explanation for these problems. 
Finally, we discuss the implications of S&T’s (2018) findings for the need to better understand the 
philosophical assumptions underlying “IS positivism.” We also counter Lee’s arguments that our 
conclusions in S&T (2018) should not make a difference to the future of IS research. 
Keywords: Positivism, Logical Positivism, IS Philosophy 
Ron Weber was the accepting senior editor. This research commentary was submitted on December 2, 2019 and 
underwent two revisions.  
1 Introduction 
Lee (2020) offers not only a critique of our paper 
(Siponen & Tsohou [S&T], 2018) on logical 
positivism (LP) in information systems (IS) but also an 
alternative explanation for positivism in IS. He 
organizes his critique as four arguments: (1) that LP as 
a school of thought in the philosophy of science is not 
legitimate; (2) that IS researchers characterizing 
positivism never said that they were following LP but 
instead characterized positivism in their own ways; (3) 
that IS researchers characterizing positivism formed “a 
conception of positivism based on a reading of what 
was going on in IS research, rather than a reading or 
misreading of logical positivism in the philosophy of 
science”; and (4) that S&T’s (2018) conclusions are 
invalid given that the premise “that what certain IS 
researchers have characterized as positivist is 
unwarranted” is invalid. 
In this paper, we respond to each of Lee’s arguments. 
We (1) provide evidence against the argument “that IS 
researchers characterizing positivism do not say that 
they were following LP” (Lee, 2020), (2) clarify our 
meaning of the term “the demise of positivism,” and 
(3) discuss the implications of S&T’s (2018) 
conclusions for IS research. 
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2 Arguments Regarding Logical 
Positivism Disrepute and Demise  
Lee’s first argument is that LP cannot be used as a 
yardstick for IS positivism because LP has been 
discredited: 
S&T conclude that what certain IS 
researchers have characterized as positivist 
is unwarranted because these researchers’ 
characterization of positivism does not hew 
to or apply the tenets of logical positivism 
as a school of thought in the philosophy of 
science. The discrediting of logical 
positivism, however, renders such a 
conclusion invalid. How may one properly 
conclude that what certain IS researchers 
have characterized as positivist is 
unwarranted when the yardstick for 
measuring what is warranted—logical 
positivism—has itself been discredited? 
(Lee, 2020, pp. 836-837) 
First, contrary to what Lee (2020) claims,1 we did not 
argue that LP tenets, as originally presented, should be 
used as a yardstick for IS research. For example, we 
noted: “The extent to which LP is useful for IS without 
careful and justified modifications is questionable” 
(S&T, 2018, p. 611). We also wrote in S&T (2018, p. 
611) that if one wants to use LP as a yardstick, then 
several theses associated with LP in IS are not 
supported by LP philosophers.2  
Second, our conclusions focused on the lack of 
justification for certain IS beliefs rather than the 
legitimacy of LP as a philosophy of science. We 
showed that IS researchers have often justified certain 
research settings (e.g., surveys, statistical analyses, and 
static variables) only by stating that they fall under the 
premise of positivism (S&T 2018, Table 3, p. 608). 
Therefore, we concluded that “IS authors list their 
positivistic assumptions without an attempt to justify 
them” (2018, p. 612). Often, IS authors do not explain: 
why these assumptions are positivistic and 
why they are justified or important in 
science/IS, other than that they are assumed 
to be positivistic. Following something 
without understanding why it is important, 
and what the strengths and weaknesses of 
such a view are, can constitute dogmatism, 
 
1 “In their argument, they return to logical positivism as the 
yardstick against which the characterizations of positivism 
by IS researchers should be judged” (Lee, 2020, p. 837). 
2 According to Lee (2020, p. 837), “S&T acknowledge but 
underplay the demise of logical positivism.” This is not what 
we say in the paper. We noted (S&T 2018, pp. 602-603) that 
some philosophers (e.g., Popper) were declared destroyers of 
and IS research should be cognizant of this 
hazard. (S&T, 2018, p. 612) 
To clarify, contrary to Lee’s (2020) claim, we did not 
claim that IS research must follow LP (S&T, 2018). 
Instead, our key point was that IS authors have often 
misunderstood LP when making claims about whether 
they have followed a positivist approach. Highlighting 
such misunderstandings does not commit us to be 
logical positivists.3 In principle, one can misconstrue 
any philosophical thesis, whether it is “discredited” or 
not. 
3 Arguments that IS Researchers 
Said They Were Never 
Following Logical Positivism 
Lee’s second argument is that “IS researchers who 
have characterized positivism in their own ways never 
said that they were following logical positivism” (Lee, 
2020). Our analysis of IS papers on positivism 
revealed that most cited only a few influential sources, 
when they justified their use or nonuse of positivism 
(S&T 2018, p. 607). These include Orlikowski and 
Baroudi (1991), Lee (1991), Walsham (1995), and 
Klein and Myers (1999). We examine, therefore, 
whether the authors of these four influential papers use 
LP to characterize their concept of positivism. Below, 
we provide evidence that contradicts Lee’s (2020) 
claim that the authors of these four papers “never said 
that they were following logical positivism.”  
1. Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991, pp. 8-9) contend: “a 
positivist research perspective is dominant in 
information systems research—a status which reflects 
much of Western science. With roots in logical 
positivism, this perspective reflects the precepts 
informing the study of natural phenomena.” Thus, they 
specifically reference LP as the source of the 
“positivist research perspective” that is “dominant in 
information systems research.” 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991, p. 9) also state: “It is 
assumed, explicitly or implicitly [by positivists], that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
constructs of a researcher's model and the events, 
objects, or features of interest in the world.” 
Orlikowski and Baroudi’s characteristic of “one-to-
one correspondence between the constructs of a 
researcher’s model and the events, objects, or features 
logical positivism. We stressed that the famous LP tenets 
such as verification were abandoned by LP adherents, mainly 
due to their self-critique (see S&T, 2018, pp. 602-603; 
section 2.3). 
3 For example, emphasizing misinterpretations of Marxism 
does not commit one to be a Marxist. 
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of interest in the world” mirrors LP’s correspondence 
theory of truth. This tenet represents “the logical and 
historical starting point of the Viennese Circle’s 
researchers” (Hempel, 1935, pp. 49-50). 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991, p. 9) further state: 
“Nomothetic statements, i.e., law-like generalizations 
independent of time or context, are possible, implying 
that scientific concepts are precise, having fixed and 
invariant meanings.” In the philosophy of science, the 
standard meaning of nomothetic statements that 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) assigned to positivism 
is the laws of nature (Mautner, 1996, p. 295). In S&T 
(2018, p. 610), we argued one could “suggest that 
logical positivists advocated laws.” Nonetheless, the 
nomological (laws) view of research is not specific to 
LP because, in the philosophy of science until the 
1970s, scientific theories were often considered to be 
nomological (Siponen & Klaavuniemi, 2020; 
Cartwright, 1980; Teller, 2004). 
Lee (2020) suggests that some IS positivism papers, 
including Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), do not 
discuss the “verifiable criterion of meaning.” We agree 
that Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) did not use this 
precise term. Nonetheless, they note, “With respect to 
knowledge, the epistemological belief of the positivist 
perspective is concerned with the empirical testability 
of theories, whether this requires theories to be 
‘verified’ or ‘falsified’” (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, 
p. 10). They referred to Chua (1986), who, in turn, 
referred to the “positivist’s belief that there exists a 
theory-independent set of observation statements that 
could be used to confirm or verify the truth of the 
theory” (p. 607). This is quite close to a “verifiable 
criterion of meaning.”  
In short, contrary to Lee’s (2020) claim that “IS 
researchers who have characterized positivism in their 
own ways never said that they were following logical 
positivism,” Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) clearly 
rooted their concept of positivism in LP. In turn, many 
IS authors base their view on positivism on Orlikowski 
and Baroudi (1991) and thus LP. For example, Lee and 
Hubona (2009, p. 238) reported their use of positivism 
is “consistent with” Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991). 
2. Lee (1991) 
Lee (1991, p. 343) clearly points out the origins of the 
positivistic approach are within a school of thought 
within the philosophy of science known as “logical 
positivism” or “logical empiricism.” He argued that “a 
major tenet of logical positivism” is the unity of 
science thesis, which “maintains that the methods of 
natural science constitute the only legitimate methods 
 
4 “The criteria used by Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991 p. 383) 
to distinguish between positivist and interpretive articles 
form a good starting point for the discussion here” 
(Walsham, 1995, p. 383). 
for use in social science” (p. 343). He then explains: 
“This approach [based on the tenet of LP “thesis of 
unity of science”] has been explicitly recognized, and 
advocated, as the ‘natural-science model’ of social-
science research” (Lee, 1991, p. 343).  
3. Klein and Myers (1999) 
Klein and Myers (1999, p. 68) separated interpretive 
research from positivism. Their sources of positivism 
included Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) and Lee 
(1991). They did not mention that positivism is based 
on LP. Nonetheless, their view of positivism is 
committed to the account of positivism provided by 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) and Lee (1991). These 
two influential papers tie positivism explicitly to LP. 
4. Walsham (1995) 
Walsham’s (1995, p. 383) “criteria” for positivism came 
from Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991).4 His account of 
positivism assumed objective data, which S&T (2018, 
pp. 609-610) connected to LP. Thus, Walsham’s notion 
of positivism is also rooted in LP. 
To clarify the main point of Section 3, according to Lee 
(2020), IS scholars characterized “positivism in their 
own ways” and they “never said that they were 
following logical positivism.” We contest Lee’s claim 
by showing how four influential IS papers on positivism 
are influenced by LP. 
4 The Shaping of Positivism in IS 
Research 
Lee (2020) argues that IS researchers did not aim to 
apply “any existing philosophy.”5 Instead, he maintains, 
“these IS researchers were shaping a conception of 
positivism based on a reading of what was going on in 
IS research rather than a reading or misreading of logical 
positivism in the philosophy of science” (p. 839). 
What, then, is positivism in IS research according to 
Lee (2020)? He argues it is characterized “as involving 
stable independent and dependent variables, survey 
research, statistics, generalizability, and so forth” 
Furthermore, he maintains that it “was in this context 
that much of what IS researchers considered to be 
positivist was largely shaped—and it was apparently 
shaped more so by what IS researchers observed to be 
going on in IS research than, if at all, in the philosophy 
of science” (p. 839).  
We agree with Lee that many IS scholars, especially 
those doing qualitative research, have reported 
pressure to meet certain standards associated with 
5  “IS researchers have not had as their main purpose the 
endeavor to apply any existing philosophy (such as logical 
positivism)” (Lee, 2020, p. 839). 
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natural sciences (see Siponen & Klaavuniemi, in 
press). Thus, we accept his argument that many of 
these researchers might have used the term 
“positivism” as a proxy for these standards (see 
Evaristo & Karahanna, 1997, p. 39; Lee, 1991, p. 
343). 6  In this regard, our account (S&T, 2018) is 
compatible with the observation that many qualitative 
or interpretive authors have reported pressure to meet 
standards dubbed positivistic. Nonetheless, Lee’s 
explanation for positivism in IS does not answer five 
critical questions. 
First, Lee’s account cannot explain why some IS 
scholars, such as Lee (1991), refer to LP and 
sometimes tenets they associate with LP (see Section 
3). Second, the claim by Lee that IS positivism 
primarily captured IS rather than any existing 
philosophy of science cannot explain why many IS 
scholars, such as Lee (1991), refer to philosophical 
tenets when describing positivism. Third, if IS 
researchers prefer to distinguish their idea of 
positivism from LP, why would they choose the term 
positivism or logical positivism to describe “what is 
going on in IS research”? Why not choose a different 
term to avoid confusion, and why choose a term that 
refers to a potentially problematic philosophy? Fourth, 
why do some IS scholars, such as Lee (1991), discuss 
Popperian concepts as positivistic, when Popper 
himself claimed that he was not a positivist, but one 
who “killed” it (S&T, 2018, p. 602)?7 Why not explain 
how they reached their views on positivism to avoid 
the confusion of basic philosophical concepts? Fifth, 
our concern was that most IS researchers simply 
mention the term “positivism” to justify their approach 
and provide no further justification for its use (S&T, 
2018, p. 606).  
In short, we agree that qualitative scholars reported 
pressure to meet some standards associated with the 
natural sciences or positivism. Lee’s alternative 
explanation for positivism describes some of this 
tension. However, our account of LP in IS (S&T, 2018) 
is compatible with this tension. Our point was to 
question the justification of the standard, known as 
positivism in IS (S&T, 2018). At the same time, Lee’s 
alternative explanation does not explain five anomalies 
explained above. 
 
6 “… organizational researchers must try harder to make the 
study of organizations fit the natural science model, since 
(according to the positivist approach) this is the only way in 
which organizational research can become truly scientific” 
(Lee, 1991, p. 343). Or consider, “the methods of natural 
science constitute the only legitimate methods for use in 
social science” (Evaristo & Karahanna, 1997, p. 39). 
7  “I was criticized as a ‘positivist’. This is an old 
misunderstanding created and perpetuated by people who 
5 Major Implications of this 
Discourse 
Lee (2020) states, “What S&T’s framework excluded, 
however, is the possibility of the existence of any 
forms of positivism other than logical positivism.” We 
accept that scholars can propose new forms of 
positivism. In S&T (2018), we did not argue or imply 
otherwise. Nonetheless, if IS scholars propose new 
versions of positivism, then these scholars should be 
clear about how these new forms of “positivism” differ 
from what is commonly known as positivism or LP in 
the philosophy of science. Otherwise, 
misunderstandings will arise, such as confusing a new 
form of positivism with LP in the philosophy of 
science. These misunderstandings can be harmful, for 
example, by unduly requiring too much from IS 
research. Proponents of new forms of positivism 
should also explain how their notion of “positivism” 
mitigates criticisms made of LP.  
Lee (2020) states that “it would be best for S&T’s 
discussion not to make a difference to the future of IS 
research.” We disagree. Lee (2020) is rightly worried 
about the use of the “discredited” philosophy of 
science. But how do we know that IS positivism, 
whether based on “what is going on IS” or not, is not 
founded on discredited, philosophically problematic 
tenets? Researchers who claim to be using a 
positivistic approach to their work need to be clear 
about the nature of their work so the merits of their 
approach can be evaluated.  
For example, critical realists (CRs) often base their 
ideas on those of Roy Bhaskar.8 Accordingly, we can 
scrutinize the specific tenets, their suitability for IS, 
and revise them if needed. Our point is not the 
vindication of CRs.9 Instead, we need to ensure that 
especially influential or normative ideas in IS research 
can withstand philosophical scrutiny and confirm that 
we know their strengths and weaknesses. 10  The 
weaknesses, hopefully, will be improved in the long 
run. In this light, future research on IS philosophy must 
scrutinize all the “positivistic” tenets in IS to ensure 
that they are not based on problematic (or 
“discredited”) ideas.  
know of my work only at second-hand” (Popper, 1977, p. 
289-290). 
8 See, e.g., Mingers et al. (2013) on CR.  
9 For example, for a critique of CR, please see Siponen et al. 
(2020). 
10 For example, if researchers claim that a natural science 
model, or positivism, must be followed to be truly scientific 
(see Lee, 1991), then this claim must withstand serious 
scrutiny. 
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6 Conclusion 
In S&T (2018), we claimed that many IS scholars 
either do not properly justify their use of positivism or 
seem to have misunderstood papers that refer to the 
philosophy of LP. Contrary to our arguments, Lee 
(2020) endeavors to show that IS scholars “have 
characterized positivism in their own ways” and that 
they “never said that they were following logical 
positivism.” Even without examining IS papers that 
claim to be positivistic, we accept Lee’s claim that IS 
scholars might have assigned a meaning to positivism 
that differs from LP. Nonetheless, our examination of 
some influential papers in the IS literature about the 
nature of positivism shows that many IS scholars who 
referenced these papers either explicitly or implicitly 
characterized positivism with reference to LP. In 
addition, there is a risk that philosophical doctrines, 
such as positivism, are sometimes used in IS without 
enough understanding of their basic principles. 
Although Lee’s explanation of how positivism arose in 
IS is important, it is incomplete. It does not address 
several important concerns discussed in S&T (2018). 
For instance, we point out that many IS researchers 
who characterize their papers as positivist provide no 
claims to support their research philosophy other than 
the label “positivism” (or similar). Lee’s response does 
not address this concern. In addition, assuming that IS 
positivism was grounded in LP, in S&T (2018) we 
explained how LP has been and continues to be often 
misunderstood. If, however, we assume that IS 
positivism was not grounded in LP, what then is the 
philosophical justification for “IS positivism”? In both 
cases, our conclusion in S&T (2018, p. 612) “that 
certain influential, taken-for-granted assumptions 
underlying IS research are unwarranted” still stands. 
We argue that our conclusion provides an opportunity 
for IS researchers to explore and justify the reasons 
behind the use of the term “positivism” in IS, 
irrespective of whether its use reflects the tenets of LP. 
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